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i. introduction
AS IS WELL KNOWN G.E. MOORE HELD that the 
thin moral property of intrinsic goodness is neither re-
ducible to, nor constituted by, natural properties but 
that it supervenes or is determined by natural properties, 
and that we know which things are intrinsically good by 
means of intuition. To many philosophers, R.M Hare 
and Bernard Williams included (who both hold that 
thin concepts are not ‘world-guided’1) this is too extrav-
agant. They find it doubtful whether any scientifically 
respectable view of the world can allow for properties 
other than natural ones. Hare sought to make progress 
with the familiar qualms about Moore’s non-naturalism 
about thin evaluative concepts by drawing a distinction 
between descriptive and evaluative predicates. Philippa 
Foot, by contrast, sought to make progress by revers-
ing the order of explanation or analysis between general 
and specific value-terms. She argues that thin evaluative 
concepts should be understood in terms of substantive 
value-terms, the thick ones, where the latter are seen as 
inherently evaluative concepts that, if we want to say 
so, pick out “first-order” moral properties. In his re-
markable 1964 article ‘Examples in Moral Philosophy’, 
Michael Tanner questions the terms upon which the ar-
gument between Hare and Foot have been premised in 
a way that calls forth another category that is precluded 
by the traditional dichotomy between fact and value, be-
tween objective and subjective. 
Hare holds that there are no rules governing what 
can count as a thin moral concept because, at the de-
scriptive level, there is nothing in common between all 
the things that we call good; no set of descriptive prop-
erties provides sufficient conditions for the use of thin 
evaluative terms such as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. For both Hare 
and Stuart Hampshire, what unifies assertions of thin 
deontic and evaluative concepts as moral judgements is 
instead to be found in the prescriptive or ‘commenda-
tory’ function of (thin) moral terms; they express our 
pro-attitudes towards certain actions.2 To assent to an 
imperative, in turn, is to prescribe action, to tell one-
self and others to do the corresponding action. How-
ever, this does not mean that assertions of goodness 
are merely non-cognitive expressions of approval. On 
1.  Bernard Williams (1979) maintains that 
thick evaluative concepts are “world-guided”, 
in as much as the thoughts and judgements 
expressed by utterances involving terms such as 
‘elegant’, ‘garish’, ‘integrity’ are candidates for 
truth and falsity. At the same time thick evalua-
tive concepts are also held to be “action-guid-
ing”, in the sense that, as Williams puts it, 
‘they are characteristically related to reasons 
for action. If a concept of this kind applies, 
this often provides someone with a reason for 
action’ (Williams 1979: 140.) William’s caveat 
about the action-guidance or practicality of 
thick evaluative concepts is arguably due to his 
reasons internalism: S has a reason to only if 
there is a “sound deliberative route” from S’s 
“actual motivational set” M to (intention to) 
do the action. On this reading, thick evaluative 
concepts provide reasons only for those who 
endorse it (the value it may be used to ascribe) 
as part of one’s “insider” evaluative outlook.
2.  Here is how Hare (1972) expresses his 
position in relation to Geach’s (1956) attack 
on the descriptive-evaluative distinction also 
for the most general term such as ‘good’ 
(which Geach holds is always attributive, never 
predicative, because one can never know what 
it is for an object to be good without knowing 
what kind of object it is): “I maintain that the 
meaning which is common to all the instances 
of the word’s use cannot be descriptive and 
that this common meaning is to be sought in 
the evaluative (commendatory) function of the 
word.” (Hare 1972: 33).
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Hare’s analysis, the content of judgements involving thin 
moral terms is found, not in their extension (which is 
held to be empty), but in the functional role they play 
in expressing our belief about the desirability of doing 
certain actions and not others. Foot’s attack on Hare (in 
her 1961 paper ‘Goodness and Choice’ and also in her 
1958 piece ‘Moral Beliefs’) is that a judgement cannot 
be identified as a moral judgement simply on the basis 
of formal characteristics such as universalisability and 
prescriptivity. Instead, she holds goodness to be tied to 
human flourishing. Focussing on substantive thick con-
cepts such as rude rather than the thin, Foot argues that 
what is common is simply that all good things are ‘of 
the kind to perform their function well’ (1961: 68-59); 
as she argues in her (1972), moral evaluations are “hy-
pothetical” in the sense that they serve an end – human 
flourishing – and will not be considered as reason-giving 
by those who do not share this end. 
In discussing the methods that Foot employs against 
Hare in her attack on the separation of descriptive 
and evaluative judgement, ‘the fashionable relating of 
“goodness” to “choice”’ (Tanner 1964: 195), Tanner 
aims to elucidate just why the disputants have gone 
wrong, which is so much more satisfying than the simple 
demonstration that they are wrong. His central claim is 
that the search for some paradigmatic feature (or mean-
ing-rule) of moral judgement as such should never have 
been begun since its outcome is irrelevant to the ques-
tion as to whether there are such rules. The explanation 
is indirect, and proceeds via the positive suggestion in 
response to Hampshire (who argues that there are no 
rational evaluations in aesthetics because there are no 
general aesthetic principles) that moral argument be 
modelled on aesthetic evaluation, rather than the other 
way round.  Tanner writes:
…if someone were to ask, “But in accordance to 
which general principles is art to be evaluated?” in 
the tone of voice of one who has worked through 
many treatises on aesthetics without finding any sat-
isfaction, the best answer would be tu quoque about 
morality. Not that general principles aren’t to be had 
there, but perhaps a fairer estimate and a deeper un-
derstanding of their role and importance, at this stage, 
would come from studying aesthetic argumentation, 
and then comparing moral argumentation with it, 
than from the reverse process, which we are all used 
to (Tanner 1964: 92).
Tanner does not elaborate on the suggestion that moral 
argumentation be viewed through the lens of aesthetic 
argumentation in his ‘Examples in Moral Philosophy’ 
essay.  But both the wider context of the article as a 
whole and the philosophical context of the time (notably 
the arrival of Frank Sibley’s (1959) seminal work ‘Aes-
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thetic Concepts’ a few years earlier), suggest that what 
is needed is precisely a re-assessment of what rational 
responsiveness to reasons might, in general, be taken to 
be in value philosophy. 
In what follows I will discuss the importance of Tan-
ner’s work for the general problem of moral relevance, 
and the significance of the first person in ethics. 
ii. universalisability and the problem of relevance
Hare’s (1965) disagreement with neo-Aristotelianism is 
complex but the feature that Tanner singles out as the 
most fundamental aspect in the dialectic between Foot’s 
naturalism and Hare’s universal prescriptivism (“an-
ti-naturalism”, but not of Moore’s sort) is Hare’s po-
sition that a “conceptual apparatus” is something that 
one adopts, and that adopting such an apparatus is dis-
tinguishable in principle from adopting a moral view, 
thus construed as a system of moral principles (Hare 
1965: 187). As R. M. Beardsmore (1969) notes, Hare’s 
view of morality involves a Kantian-like notion of uni-
versalisability applied to some prescriptive standard that 
we hold in a way that allows the speaker to choose her 
own standards, so long as we are prepared to hold it 
for everyone in principle.3 Such universalised standards 
serve as a basis for prescriptive statements of the form 
“x is good” (translated as “do or choose x”). Focussing 
on Hampshire (1967), who held a similar view of moral 
judgement but rejected it for aesthetics, Tanner argues 
that this picture of morality involves a confused assimi-
lation of generality and universality. He writes:
It is only if one is thinking of [general moral com-
monplaces] as paradigms of moral judgements that 
one is able to say, “Anyone who moralizes necessarily 
generalizes” and mean by that more than that anyone 
who makes a judgement on a certain situation is com-
mitted to making the same judgement on any exactly, 
or relevantly, similar situation. If one does not mean 
more than that, one is merely stressing the rationality 
of moral judgement, in the sense that one is demand-
ing that they be consistent. And from the demand for 
consistency in morality nothing follows as to the dif-
ference between moral discourse and other forms of 
rational discourse, of which aesthetic discourse may 
be a member; quite the contrary – the universalisabil-
ity-criterion assimilates, it does not differentiate (Tan-
ner 1964: 191).
Universalisability, the move from the particular case to 
all cases that are similar in relevant respects, needs to 
be distinguished from generality because the latter is 
thought to be a degree concept. Don Loeb (1996) argues 
that generality, the move from the particular case to the 
broad sort that includes the particular case, is a degree 
3.  Hare’s use of the practical syllogism differs 
from that of Kant because, unlike Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative, we are not constrained 
by what abstract reason allows in selecting our 
standards on Hare’s analysis.
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concept because it involves ‘…a measure of the relative 
range of application of a moral principle’ (1996: 80-81). 
Universality, on the other hand, is different, because it 
does not involve reference to the particular circumstanc-
es from which it emerges (such as the agent making the 
judgement); one can hold a principle to be universal ‘ ... 
if it can be stated without the use of any proper names 
or indexicals’ (Loeb 1996: 81). This does also seem to be 
Tanner’s position. In discussing Bernard Mayo’s (1958) 
distinction between moral relationships and personal 
relationships, for instance, he argues that judgements 
on personal relationships can usually be made without 
explicit reference to the “uniqueness of the other per-
son” (Tanner 1964: 193), but this does not mean that 
the judgements do not in fact concern personal relation-
ships. Hence, there is no good reason to say that person-
al relationships fall outside the scope of morality.4 
In questioning the default assumption that morali-
ty must depend on general principles, Tanner’s position 
could be read as an early formulation of moral particu-
larism, although this reading is not mandatory; as noted 
by Julia Driver (2012) and many others, everyone can 
agree that a feature’s reason-giving force depends upon 
context. The key question is how context enters into the 
equation. One option is to adopt a standard contextu-
alist view and say that a concept’s standards of applica-
tion can vary depending on the circumstances, where the 
role of context is to provide an epistemic filter whereby 
some, but not all, possibilities can be properly ignored. 
This is a standard way in which the problem of rele-
vance has been understood (see e.g. Dancy 2004). What 
more needs to be said? 
Well, one thing that needs to be said is that it is noto-
riously difficult to articulate precisely what makes a pos-
sibility sufficiently remote for it to be properly ignored 
(or not). The reason is that such judgements are typical-
ly made against a background of presuppositions about 
what is constant between circumstances in which the re-
lation of normative support between, e.g., chastity and 
goodness does not hold and situations in which it does 
hold. We rely on background assumptions all the time 
in navigating the world. It may be true that if you strike 
a dry, well-made match, it will light. As with other ge-
nerics and “for the most part” generalisations, the claim 
that this would be so is not rendered false by the fact 
that if you remove the oxygen, then the struck match 
will not light. Tanner’s point, I think, is that moral rele-
vance is context-dependent and that its context-depend-
ency affects notions to which it is conceptually linked 
like that of criterial status in ethics and aesthetics, thus 
understood factively as yielding knowledge. Others have 
made similar claims (McDowell (1998), Dretske (1971), 
4.  For further discussion and defence of this 
claim see, e.g.. Driver (2003) and De Gaynes-
ford (2010).
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Travis (2005)). So what are the implications of this for 
the problem of moral argument with which we started?
iii. tanner’s method
Earlier I suggested that, in recommending that moral 
argument be understood by comparison with aesthetic 
evaluation, Tanner urges us to move beyond a certain 
view of what an argument must be like for it to count 
as rational. Tanner’s conception of the wider possibil-
ities for philosophical argument on the subject-matter 
of ethics can, I think, be brought into sharper focus by 
comparison with Wittgenstein’s idea of a ‘perspicuous 
representation’ as being a key aspect of the task of phi-
losophy as he sees it: offering a model of comparison 
that ‘earmarks the form of account we give, the way we 
look at things’ (PI §122) in order to achieve a ‘clear view’ 
of that which is troubling us (PI §133). However this does 
not mean that there is some single philosophical method 
through which this is achieved. On the contrary, Witt-
genstein presents the philosopher with an open-ended 
range of conceptual tools and techniques that can be 
used in a variety of different ways, including (but not 
limited to): offering ‘objects of comparison’ and present-
ing ‘alternative pictures’; pointing out particular ‘family 
resemblances’ and ‘neglected aspects’ of our language; 
grammatical analysis of our use of language in practice, 
and so on. The real task at hand is to discern which 
method is the most pointful in each context of critical 
appraisal for attaining clarity and revealing meaning – 
to which “whatever it takes” would be the only answer 
to give in the abstract.5
Now, in terms of what (what we may think of as) 
Wittgenstein’s method looks like in practice, one is re-
minded of Sibley’s (1983) notion of a ‘perceptual proof’ 
in aesthetic evaluation.6 The focus of Sibley’s discussion 
is Michael Scriven’s (1966) scepticism about what he 
calls the ‘independence requirement’ for aesthetic eval-
uation. The independence requirement is a demand on 
rational (aesthetic) thought that ‘we must be able to 
know the reason or reasons for a conclusion without 
first having to know the conclusion; otherwise we can 
never get the reason as a means to the conclusion’ (Sib-
ley 1983/2001: 115). In its strongest form, the independ-
ence requirement demands that reasons must be logical-
ly prior to aesthetic verdicts (as opposed to temporally 
prior in perception). Like Wittgenstein before him, Sib-
ley does not attempt a refutation of the sceptic by way 
of showing how the independence requirement could be 
met. Instead he effectively uses the strategy of offering a 
‘perspicuous representation’ of art criticism by pointing 
to the way it is actually practised to show that aesthetic 
evaluations stand in no need of external validation. He 
5.  The meaning of the notion a ‘perspicuous 
representation’ is controversial within Wittgen-
stein scholarship. Read and Hutchinson argue 
that the notion of a perspicuous representation 
is not to be understood as a way of seeing 
things and there cannot be multiple perspicu-
ous ways of seeing the rules of ‘our grammar’; 
any difference we might perceive between 
multiple perspicuous representations of an 
area of our grammar is merely a difference in 
how they are selected and arranged, something 
that can vary depending on the purpose of the 
investigation. (In this respect, perspicuous rep-
resentations are seen as ‘additive’, in as much 
as we can combine multiple perspicuous rep-
resentations of a thing’s parts in order to gain 
a perspicuous representation of the whole.) 
Whether or not this is the best representation 
of Wittgenstein’s position falls beyond the 
scope of this paper. I am inclined to agree with 
Gregory Currie (1993) (who in turn follows 
John McDowell) that a representation (as used 
in ordinary contexts) that transcends any point 
of view seems incoherent, but I cannot argue 
for this claim here. For further discussion see, 
e.g., Moore (1997), Baker (2006), Read and 
Hutchinson (2008). 
6.  Sibley first introduced the notion of a ‘per-
ceptual proof’ in his seminal (1959). 
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writes: 
How a critic manages by what he says and does to 
bring people to see aesthetic qualities they have missed 
has frequently puzzled writers. But there is no real rea-
son for mystification. […] What mainly is required is a 
detailed description of the sorts of things critics in fact 
do and say, for this is what succeeds if anything does; 
the critic may make similes and comparisons, describe 
the work in appropriate metaphors, gesticulate apt-
ly and so on. Almost anything he may do, verbal or 
non-verbal, can on occasion prove successful. To go 
on to ask how these methods can possibly succeed is 
to begin to ask how people can ever be brought to see 
aesthetic (and Gestalt and other similar) properties at 
all. (Sibley 1965/2001: 38). 
Thus, for Sibley and Wittgenstein, there is no one 
method of how we ought to do philosophy, but rather 
we employ a range of different tools that fit the task at 
hand; whatever it takes. 
What Tanner has to say about this is found primar-
ily in his symposium-piece ‘Objectivity and Aesthetics’ 
(1968) (which is a response to Sibley’s account of aes-
thetic concepts as taste concepts on a par with secondary 
qualities) and his treatise on Nietzsche (1994). As Derek 
Matravers (2003) points out, Tanner’s problem with art 
is that, in engaging with artworks that endorse alterna-
tive moral outlooks, ‘we sometimes find ourselves fic-
tionally assenting to moral properties we think are ac-
tually false’ (Matravers 2003: 101). A central feature of 
Tanner’s treatise on Nietzsche, in turn, is the recognition 
that moral philosophers, when presenting themselves as 
studying a specific issue in moral philosophy, are in fact 
always relying on background beliefs about the world 
that are, themselves, contestable. Here is the conclusion 
that Tanner (1964) draws from contestability in relation 
to Foot’s neo-Aristotelian response to Hare:
…whether we are confronted with a concept to which 
the family-resemblance treatment is appropriate, not 
only as regards the observable properties which the 
object designates […], but also as regards the func-
tion which it fulfils or the purposes it serves […], then 
there might arise legitimate differences as to which 
things instantiate the concept better than others. […] 
A dispute about whether one thing is better than an-
other, which is unsettlable, when we have all the in-
formation about the things themselves, must become 
a dispute about the purposes which those things serve; 
a dispute, in other words, about ends, and thus about 
the nature of the beings who have those ends. And 
neither Mrs. Foot nor anyone else has done much 
more to show that her account of knives or plants 
works there (Tanner 1964: 197-8). 
One sometimes hears the objection that Foot’s ad-
herence to Wittgenstein’s descriptivist methodology 
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(which is also found in Aristotle’s naturalism) ‘leads her 
to a kind of critical social theory’ (Hacker-Wright 2013: 
150). Hacker-Wright (2013: 150) argues that, although 
she has substantive disagreements with Hare and other 
consequentialists, ‘in representing her work as a moral-
ly neutral, conceptual project of uprooting “intruding” 
philosophical theories’, Foot appears vulnerable to the 
criticism that moral disagreement can stem from a dif-
ference in worldview questioning the very conceptual 
foundations of a given moral outlook – an objection that 
Iris Murdoch raised against Hare in her 1956 symposi-
um piece ‘Vision and Choice in Morality’. This is pre-
cisely Tanner’s worry with Foot’s argument; the extent 
to which her arguments are taken as definitive may itself 
depend on whether her audience shares her substantive 
moral commitments as well as implicit views of other 
matters. As Tanner rightly notes, Hare need not deny 
Foot and Austin’s (1961) claims about there being spe-
cialised thick moral concepts. What he rejects is the idea 
that such concepts may be tied to the conception of what 
the situation is – tied to it in the sense that understand-
ing what normative purport a moral situation has might 
be unattainable to people who rejected or withheld cer-
tain evaluative concepts. Tanner writes:
All that Mrs. Foot succeeds in showing is that, given 
the meaning of certain evaluative terms, and grant-
ed that we are prepared to employ them at all, then 
we are not entitled to apply or withhold them in ac-
cordance with our chosen criteria. But Hare’s point 
is prior to this: it is about our preparedness to make 
certain evaluations in the first place; or about, if you 
like, what our moral vocabulary is to be. Mrs. Foot’s 
argument only operates, given a moral vocabulary. 
But implicit in her argument, and occasionally explic-
it too, is the much more important and dubious claim 
that we have no choice as to what to account as harms 
and benefits. (Tanner 1964: 198).
Tanner (1994) makes the point that individuals are 
rarely asked to fictionally assent to single moral state-
ments; rather, moral statements come in the expression 
of a comprehensive worldview, a vision of the actual 
world that shapes precisely what one takes to be sali-
ent and not in moral disagreement. Tanner’s point, if I 
am right, echoes Iris Murdoch’s (1956) view that fun-
damental moral disagreements may be more a matter of 
differences in structure of competing visions, such that 
one party cannot even see how the other ‘goes on’ to 
apply the term in question to new cases, or what might 
be the point of doing so. This, I maintain, is also the key 
to the conclusion Tanner draws from his discussion of 
Hare and Foot, that “we need to study the structure of 
a whole system of morality in order to understand the 
postulated relationships between fact and value, and ba-
sic and derived values, which are to be found in it, rather 
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than studying isolated statements or fragmentary argu-
ments which might occur within several quite different 
total moral outlooks” (1964: 199). Crucially, world-
views are comprehensive outlooks on reality, an unruly 
mix of evaluative and non-evaluative claims in complex 
interaction as a whole. To illustrate, consider the differ-
ence in structure between a Nazi outlook upon the world 
and that of a Christian vision. As Matravers notes, while 
a Nazi worldview ‘will include a raft of claims about 
genetics and history, and views about the sublimation 
of individual goals to the greater destiny of the state, a 
Christian worldview will include claims about historical 
events, together with views concerning the primacy of 
faith, hope and charity’ (2003: 101). 
Once we take seriously the suggestion that the moral-
ly relevant facts cannot be accessed except through some 
perspective, an alternative to the conceptual map with 
which we started begins to emerge. On the new model, 
‘objectivity’ is no longer treated as an opposite, mutually 
exclusive, category to that of the ‘subjective’ and ‘par-
ticular’ aspect of the discerning moral judge. And the 
reason is that moral judgement (and the worldviews of 
historical individuals more generally) is no longer theo-
retically construed as mere opinion to be checked against 
universal moral standards but rather the very means for 
giving a verdict on alternative sources and balancing 
their relevance to the particular case at hand.
I end with some concluding remarks about the wider 
significance of the present picture in elucidating the use 
of concepts such as value and perspective more general-
ly.
iv. concluding remarks
I have argued that the emphasis placed on context that 
is present in both Tanner’s and Murdoch’s accounts of 
value experience as always already structured by the 
concepts and parochial sensibilities at one’s disposal 
effectively declares content-involving (and so rationali-
ty-involving) phenomena in human life to be inseparable 
from point or purpose. Nothing is valuable from ‘the 
point of view of the universe’; value is always value for 
us (Dancy, 1993: 162). Tanner himself seems to assume 
that the emphasis on point or purpose must presuppose 
that facts about the valuer enter into the reflective ex-
planation of the truth conditions of ethical or aesthetic 
claims in ways that render them radically perspectival. 
But this conclusion is premature: the general idea that 
evaluative claims are ‘perspectival’ is ambiguous be-
tween a number of readings that we should be careful 
to distinguish. 
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One option is to say that content and human-in-
volving interests are interdependent: neither can be un-
derstood except in connection with the other. As Alan 
Thomas puts it, ‘we respond to value and yet everything 
relevant to our subjective [human] perspective can bear 
on the process of evaluation and hence what those eu-
daimonistic values mean for us’ (2012: 150). Thomas 
(2012) maintains that the correct way to conceive of 
this value is, indeed, presuppositionally. It does not en-
ter into the truth conditions of an evaluative claim that 
such claims are relativized to the human standpoint.7 By 
contrast, the picture that troubles Tanner opens the door 
to something more: to the prospect that we can see val-
ue content as determined by independently specifiable 
conceptual frameworks, patterns of attention, or on a 
larger scale, generic socio-political cultural narratives 
that are discernible in public discourse. In so far as the 
promise of a reappraisal of Tanner’s account lies in such 
a reduction of meaning/value to a perspective, it is a new 
paradigm I think we should resist. And the reason is that 
we should distinguish conditions on the valuing subject 
from conditions on the associated value.  
Such reorientation of focus makes available a dis-
tinctive mode of criticism, in which claims to ‘objective’ 
meaning in conceptual frameworks are criticised not as 
false per se, but as failing to yield the insight about the 
problem of objective meaning it was the point of those 
claims to provide. The conceptual framework of one’s 
‘life-world’ can reveal (or obfuscate) the object’s mean-
ing, it does not determine the object’s meaning. To think 
otherwise would be to conflate what is represented with 
the representation.
To make good this claim we may follow the basic 
tactic of Adrian Moore’s (1997) defence of ‘absolute rep-
resentations’, representations that can be added without 
danger of conflicting points of view, and distinguish be-
tween the conditions of the production of a representa-
tion on the one hand and ‘the role that the representa-
tion can play in such process as indirect integration’ on 
the other (Moore 1997: 89). The central claim would 
be that the perspectivalness of the production of a rep-
resentation, expressive of an answerable stance upon the 
world that (at least in the evaluative case) includes the 
history of whatever conceptual apparatus that is used in 
it, has no effect on the stance-independence of the latter.8 
Just how we should best understand the relation of 
the parochial to that of an absolute conception of the 
world is something that I leave open for future work. 
The claim here is simply that the “producer” of an eval-
uative representation has a point of view operative in 
producing it; the context of the agent betrays a stance 
7.  Thomas (2012: 150) gives the following 
example: ‘Postboxes are not red for humans; 
postboxes are red. In the latter claim the per-
spectivalness of colour discourse as a whole is 
presupposed’ – and similarly for the notion of 
value relative to our human perspective. 
8.  Moore writes: “One attractive feature of 
this tactic is that it leaves considerable room 
for concession whenever anyone insists on 
the parochial, conditioned, nay, perspectival 
character of any act of producing a represen-
tation. They are right to insist on this, if it is 
properly understood. Apart from anything else, 
any act of producing a representation in an act, 
and agency itself is impossible without some 
(evaluative) point of view giving sense to the 
question of what to do. But one possible thing 
to do is to represent the world from no point 
of view.” (Moore, 1997: 89) 
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upon the world. This preserves a critical stance, in as 
much as we are now in a position to hold that the route 
to ethical truth will be stance-dependent, shaped by 
one’s conceptions, and yet think of competing concep-
tual frameworks as offering different perspectives on the 
object of inquiry – without thereby reducing meaning 
and truth to a perspective.99.  I am grateful to Philip Mallaband for his 
comments and suggestions. I have also benefit-
ed from discussions of the core themes of this 
paper with Jonathan Dancy, Pekka Väyrynen, 
Alan Thomas, Robert Cowan, Michael Brady, 
Simon Robertson and David Davies. Finally 
I want to thank Ben Colburn for his patience 
and wonderful kindness enabling me to com-
plete this work. 
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